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MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs-ZoNING-AMoRTIZATION oF Ex!sTING NoN-
CONFORMING UsEs-ln 1930 defendant Gage acquired several lots in the City of 
Los Angeles. He constructed a residential building in which he established a 
wholesale and retail plumbing business, using one room as an office for the 
conduct of his business. Also used in the business were a garage and racks, bins, 
and stalls for the storage of materials and supplies. The use to which defendant 
put the property was permitted under the applicable zoning ordinance of 1930. 
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Later the ordinance was changed so as to make defendant's use of both lots 
nonconforming. In 1946 another rezoning ordinance provided that the non-
conforming commercial use of a residential building and the nonconforming 
use of land where no buildings were employed in connection with such use 
should be discontinued within five years. Five years having elapsed, plaintiff 
brought suit for an injunction ordering defendant to discontinue the prohibited 
use of his property. The lower court refused an injunction on the ground that 
to order defendant to abandon a twenty-year-old user would be a deprivation 
of property without due process of law. On appeal, held, reversed. The re-
quirement that an existing nonconforming use be discontinued within five 
years from the date of passage of the zoning ordinance is a constitutional 
exercise of the police power. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, (Cal. App. 1954) 
274 P. (2d) 34. 
Nonconforming uses1 existing at the time a zoning ordinance goes into effect 
are carefully protected.2 There are, however, various techniques employed to 
secure the gradual elimination of these uses, and in general they are constitu-
tional. Discontinuance of a nonconforming use may constitute abandonment 
and its resumption may be prohibited.3 Changes and extensions of use may be 
prohibited with a view toward gradual natural elimination.4 The power of emi-
nent domain might also be employed to remove certain uses. 5 Although these 
methods were at one time considered an adequate solution to the problem of 
eliminating nonconforming uses, it is now apparent that they are not. There 
is little hope that such uses will disappear by themselves where the nonconform-
ing use enjoys a monopolistic advantage, protected from further invasion by the 
zoning ordinance.6 As a more efficient device to insure the eventual conformity 
of a zone, a number of states and municipalities have adopted a plan of amorti-
zation. 7 This is a plan whereby the nonconforming use must be discontinued 
1 For a discussion of what constitutes a nonconforming use and the proof thereof, see 
8 McQmLLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRAnoNs §25.185 et seq. (1950). See also 102 Umv. PA. 
L. REv. 91 at 94 (1953). 
2 To the effect that a zoning ordinance cannot prohibit existing lawful nonconforming 
uses, see Standard Oil Co. v. Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 50 S.W. (2d) 960 (1932); 
Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930); 86 A.L.R. 648 (1933). Noncon-
forming uses are also often protected by special statutory provisions. 1951 Wxs. L. REv. 
685 at 688. 
3 Where a nonconforming use has been abandoned, all further use of land or buildings 
must be in conformity with the zoning ordinance. State ex rel. Turner v. Baumhauer, 234 
Ala. 286, 174 S. 514 (1937); Beszedes v. Board of Commrs. of Arapahoe County, 116 
Colo. 123, 178 P. (2d) 950 (1947). See 18 A.L.R. (2d) 725 (1951). 
4 For two theories as to what limitations may be placed on existing uses, compare In 
re Gillillan's Permit, 291 Pa. 358, 140 A. 136 (1927) with Ballercia v. Quinn, 320 Mass. 
687, 71 N.E. (2d) 235 (1947). 
5 See Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §125.583(a); State ex rel. Twin City B. & I. Co. 
v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159 (1919). Cf. Riverbank Improvement Co. v. 
Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N.E. 244 (1917). 
6 See 1951 Wxs. L. REv. 685. See also Bettman, "A Backward Step in Zoning," 16 
Jotm. LANI> AND PUllLIC UnLITY EcoN. 455 (1940). 
1 See, e.g., Colo. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) c. 45A, §19 (county zoning); ill. Rev. 
Stat. (1953) c. 24, §73-1 (city zoning); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §19-2919 (county 
zoning); Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) tit. 19, c. 19, §862.16 (county zoning); Pa. Stat. 
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within a prescribed time. Whether this delayed definite prohibition of an exist-
ing nonconforming use constitutes a talcing of property without due process of 
law has not often come before the courts. In two cases8 the Louisiana Supreme 
Court has upheld a one year amortization period as applied to a grocery store 
and a drug store, but the reasoning was confused by the court's views on the 
law of nuisance. While it is recognized that a legislature may extend the com-
mon law nuisance doctrine,9 to expand it to include such hannless enterprises 
as grocery stores and drug stores seems arbitrary.10 More recently, amortization 
of a filling station was upheld on the ground that it was a reasonable exercise 
of the state police power, 11 but the court relied on authority upholding statu-
tory expansions of nuisance where the power of the state is conceded to be 
absolute.12 The question remains whether the state has the power to require 
elimination of uses which are not within the permissible expansion of the law 
of nuisance, but are within the state's power to prohibit in the future under the 
"zoning power." To require immediate elimination of such a use would be 
invalid.13 An amortization of such use within a "reasonable" time has been held 
to be invalid.14 An amortization of such use within a "fixed" period of time is 
upheld in the principal case, the theory being that elimination of nonconforming 
uses by this particular method is as valid an exercise of police power as elimina-
tion by way of discontinuance or limitations on expansion, alteration, and 
repairs.15 Thus the principal case provides a better rationale for sustaining 
amortization of existing uses than any of the earlier cases. The court squarely 
Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1954) tit. 16, §510.14 (county zoning); Utah Code Ann. (1943) 
§19-24-18 (county zoning); Va. Code (1950) §15-843 (city zoning). Cities with amorti-
zation plans (cited in principal case at 41): Los Angeles Mun. Code, §12.123 B&C (1946); 
Chicago Zoning Ord. §20 (1944); Richmond, Va., Zoning Ord., Art. XIlI, §1 (1948); 
Wichita, Kan., Zoning Ord. §24 (1948). 
s State ex rel. Detna Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 S. 613 (1929), cert. 
den. 280 U.S. 556; State ex rel. Detna Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 S. 314 
(1929). 
9 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143 (1915) (elimination of a brick 
kiln); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246 (1928) (elimination of disease-
carrying trees). In most of the cases in which legislation of this kind has been sustained, 
the use prohibited has been one of a type causing some tangible harm such as soot, odors, 
or noise. See 41 CoL. L. REv. 457 at 464 (1941). 
10 For criticisms of the Louisiana decisions see O'Reilly, "The Nonconforming Use and 
Due Process of Law," 23 G:i;o. L.J. 218 at 226 (1935); 39 YAL:i; L.J. 735 at 737 (1930). 
11 Standard Oil Co. v. Talahassee, (5th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 410. 
12 In Standard Oil Co. v. Talahassee, note 11 supra, the court relied principally on 
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, note 9 supra. Whether the court was correct in allowing the 
elimination of a filling station as a reasonable exercise of the police power because of its 
proximity to the state capital and a school is questionable. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Bowling 
Green, note 2 supra, where it was held that it was not within the state's police power to 
require the elimination of a filling station located in a residential neighborhood. 
13 Jones v. Los Angeles, note 2 supra. 
14Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E. (2d) 697 (1953), noted in 67 
HAn.v. L. REv. 1283 (1954). 
15 Principal case at 44. The constitutionality of other techniques used to eliminate 
nonconforming uses is discussed in 147 A.L.R. 167 (1943). 
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faced the question whether amortization was a reasonable exercise of the police 
power and decided that under these circumstances it was.16 
Existing nonconforming uses present a serious problem to city planners.17 To 
meet the problem it is necessary to use a device which adequately protects 
private property, 18 does not unduly discourage future investment, and minimizes 
economic waste.19 On the other hand, the device must be effective enough that 
the eventual elimination of the nonconforming use will be assured. A proper 
scheme of amortization, designed to take into account this conllict of interests, 
is the best solution yet proposed. 
James W. Beatty, S.Ed. 
16 The cost of moving was found to be less than one percent of the minimum gross 
income for the live years. 
17 Oppermann, "Non-Conforming Use and the City Plan," 15 Joun. l.AND AND POBuc 
UTILITY EcoN. 94 (1939); Bartholomew, ''Non-Conforming Uses Destroy the Neighbor-
hood," id. at 96. 
18 Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. 447 (1928). See 30 YALB L.J. 735 
at 739 (1930). 
10 102 Umv. PA. L. REv. 91 (1953). 
